In this paper it is argued that, if two products or geographic areas belong in the same market, their relative price must be stationary. Hence stationarity tests like the ADF and the KPSS can be helpful in delineating the relevant market for Antitrust purposes, particularly for abuses of dominant positions and agreements between competitors. The proposed procedure is strictly related with cointegration analysis but is simpler and has more general validity. An application to the Italian milk market illustrates the technique.
Introduction
A precise delineation of the market, both in the product and the geographic dimension, is a crucial preliminary step for antitrust analysis. In order to establish whether a merger will have adverse competitive effects, the antitrust agency should compare the pre-and post-merger concentration levels, which may depend dramatically on the way in which the market boundaries have been traced. Similarly, evaluating whether a company has a dominant position or an agreement between competitors may have anticompetitive effects can only be done once the market has been exactly delineated. If the market definition is too large, a firm having a dominant position may look in competition with several firms, while the opposite mistake can be made when the definition is too narrow.
From a theoretical point of view, the concept of 'antitrust market' has been accurately defined in the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 1992) . This definition has recently been advocated by the European Commission (European Commission, 1997) and is an important reference point for the economic debate and the antitrust authorities of several countries. Unfortunately, the definition of the Merger Guidelines cannot be easily translated into an econometric procedure, so that there is no general consensus among economists about the quantitative methods which should be used to delineate antitrust markets. This lack of consensus is probably a major reason why, in practice, antitrust agencies usually define the relevant market by resorting to common sense and qualitative considerations.
The prevailing view about the most suitable statistical methodology is that the authority should decide on the basis of an estimate of the elasticity of the residual demand function (Scheffman and Spiller, 1987 , Baker and Bresnahan, 1988 , Kamerschen and Kohler 1993 ; for a review see Office of Fair Trading, 1999). We shall refer to this view as the 'demand elasticity' view. According to Werden and Froeb (1993) , this is the only methodology which is fully consistent with the Merger Guidelines. A shortcoming of this methodology is that it is difficult to implement in general (Stigler and Sherwin, 1985) and impossible in a large number of relevant antitrust cases, i.e. all cases of anticompetitive agreements and abuses of dominant position (White 2000) .
This lack of operational content is a strong argument in favor of a different line of research, according to which products should be grouped in a single market when prices 'move together' in some well-defined sense. The basic idea behind the latter approach, which could be called the 'price comovement' approach, is that a market is characterized by product homogeneity and arbitrage will prevent prices for the same good from moving independently of each other (Stigler and Sherwin, 1985) . Empirically, several kinds of tests have been proposed, based on regression, contemporaneous correlation, Granger causality and cointegration (Horowitz, 1981; Stigler and Sherwin, 1985 ; ; Slade, 1986) . Generally speaking, the methods proposed by the price comovement literature are relatively easy to apply and data requirements are minimal, since only the series of prices are needed. However, despite the theoretical inspiration being essentially the same, the methods proposed in practice are different and can lead to different results. Moreover, these methods have been criticized because of their ambiguous relation with the concept of 'antitrust market' (as opposed to 'economic market' or 'trade market') as defined in the Merger Guidelines (Sheffman and Spiller, 1987 , Baker, 1987 , Werden and Froeb, 1993 .
In this paper, I propose a method which is very much in the spirit of the latter line of thought but avoids some important criticisms. The method is conceptually simple and involves only well-known econometric techniques. I argue that a necessary condition for two products being in the same antitrust market is that the log of the price ratio is stationary. Consequently, I propose to apply stationarity tests to the log of such ratio. If the tests indicate nonstationarity, we can conclude in favor of distinct markets. The proposed method is closely related with cointegration techniques, but is simpler and has more general validity.
The technique is illustrated by means of an empirical application to the market of fresh milk in Italy. I use series of prices obtained by elaborating on weekly data provided by AcNielsen, relative to different kinds of fresh milk in different areas during the period March 1999-March 2001. I conclude that the Italian regions are distinct geographic markets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the prevailing definition of Antitrust market. Section 3 describes the difficulties of a direct empirical implementation of the merger-guidelines definition. Section 4 explains the proposed stationarity test procedure. Section 5 discusses the relations with the literature. The empirical illustration is reported in Section 6. The last section concludes.
nontransitory' increase in price, assuming the terms of sale of all other products are held constant. A relevant market is a group of products and a geographic area which is no bigger than necessary to satisfy this test (Federal Trade Commission and the US Department of Justice, 1992, Section 1.0).
This definition is closely related to the notion of 'market power'. According to the Merger Guidelines, "mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance market power," defined as "the ability profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time" (ibidem, Section 0.1). If contrasting market power is the aim of the Antitrust Agency, it is quite natural to define the market as the smallest context in which the creation of a significant amount of market power is possible in principle. Clearly, if the relevant market were defined too narrowly, in such a way as to exclude very close substitutes, a hypothetic single producer could not raise prices above the competitive level without losing his customers, so that a merger could not create market power. On the other hand, if the market were defined too largely, the ability of a merger to enhance market power could be substantially underestimated.
The market definition of the Merger Guidelines is also adopted for nonmerger antitrust cases: the recent Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration among Competitors states that "in general, for goods markets affected by a competitor collaboration, the Agencies approach relevant market definition as described in Section 1 of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines" (Federal Trade Commission and the US Department of Justice, 2000, Section 3.32 (a)). Moreover, a similar definition is given by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), UK (OFT 1998, Section 2.8). In the 'Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market', the European Commission is somewhat more vague:
A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use (EC 1997, p.2).
However, in the discussion which follows the sentence above there is a reference to the profitability of "an hypothetical small [...], permanent relative price increase in the products and areas being considered." (ibidem, p.4).
In order to see whether the hypothetical monopolist would rise prices, we should be able to evaluate profits at different price levels. This requires estimation of the cost function of our hypothetical firm or cartel, which in most cases is impossible. Without the cost function, we cannot be sure that an increase in price will reduce profits.
Luckily, there are cases in which we can be sure that an increase in price raises profits. This is when it raises revenues (because costs cannot rise). Since we know that revenues increase if and only if the own-price elasticity of demand is smaller than one, we can get important indications by estimating such elasticity, which is feasible in principle. However, we should recognize that such estimation involves technical problems and requires a lot of information. Moreover, we should keep in mind that we have only a sufficient condition for profitability. If we find an elasticity greater than one, the result is inconclusive.
But the main problem with the demand elasticity strategy is that demand elasticity depends on price. Typically, we shall find figures smaller than one for low prices and larger than one for high prices. Hence the question is: which price should we look at?
The definition of market adopted in the Guidelines is not explicit on this. But the very notion of market power reported above implies that the reference point should be the price that would prevail in a competitive situation, which unfortunately is not observable. This conclusion is explicit in the document by the UK Agency (OFT 1998, Section 2.8). Moreover, it is indirectly confirmed by the following passage of the Guidelines:
In the above analysis, the Agency will use prevailing prices of the products of the merging firms [...] unless premerger circumstances are strongly suggestive of coordinated interaction, in which case the Agency will use a price more reflective of the competitive price (Federal Trade Commission and the US Department of Justice, 1992, Section 1.11).
In other words, the competitive price is the correct benchmark in theory, but in practice it can be replaced by the current price, whenever the pre-merger situation is not too far from perfect competition. The exception is necessary because at the monopoly price demand cannot be rigid, otherwise the monopolist would not be profit maximizing. Put another way, a hypothetical monopolist would not increase price, if the monopoly price is already prevailing. Hence, at the monopoly price, the elasticity test would not make any sense. This observation has become known in the Antitrust literature as the 'Cellophane fallacy'. The US Department of Justice claimed that Du Pont had a dominant position in the cellophane market, while Du Pont claimed that the relevant market was much larger (flexible wrapping materials). The Court decided in favor of Du Pont, not taking into account that other flexible wrapping materials were highly competitive with respect to cellophane, precisely because of the high price of cellophane fixed by Du Pont (Stocking and Mueller, 1955) .
Going back to the Guidelines, it seems that, in order to define the market, we should know in advance the competitive price; or, at least, we should be able to exclude that the market is characterized by a 'coordinated interaction'. But evaluating the existing degree of competition could be precisely the reason why we need a definition of the relevant market! Clearly, there is a logical difficulty here.
In merger cases, the problem is somewhat less disturbing. After all, the current price is what really matters, because, when evaluating mergers, the target of the Antitrust Agency is to prevent the creation of a new firm having the power to increase prices above the current level (Posner, 1976) .
But in many important cases the goal of the Agency is to identify an already existing monopoly or collusion among competitors. In such cases, the demand elasticity strategy leads to a inescapable circular reasoning. The embarrassment related to this logical difficulty is transparent in the following passage of the Antitrust Guidelines for collaborations among competitors: In such monopoly cases the Merger Guidelines market definition and its 'demand elasticity' econometric implementation are simply unfeasible (Sherwin 1993 , White 2000 and different methods are needed.
Stationarity tests and the proposed methodology
There is little doubt that, if two products or geographic areas belong to the same market, their prices will not move indefinitely far from each other in the long run. The economic intuition is a simple arbitrage argument: if the products are very close substitutes, either on the demand or on the supply side, their prices cannot move too far apart, since either consumers or producers will shift between them in such a way as to eliminate the more expensive one from the market. This consideration can be rendered precise and operational by resorting to the statistical concept of stationarity.
Time series are said to be covariance stationary, or wide-sense stationary, if their moments up to the second order do not depend on time. Hence, for instance, the mean must be constant over time. An important property of stationary series is that they frequently cross their mean line and exhibit a tendency to revert to it. In this sense, we say that the shocks affecting stationary series have only temporary effects. For this reason, the long-run prediction of the series is equal to the mean.
By contrast, a series is said to be difference-stationary (DS) if its first difference is stationary, but the series itself is not. A property of DS series is that they do not have necessarily a constant mean and do not frequently cross any horizontal line. The variance of a DS series grows with time without limit and the shocks affecting it are permanent, i.e. their effects last forever. For these reasons, if the difference between two log prices is DS, the log prices can move far from each other without limit as time goes on. Several stationarity tests have been proposed in the literature. Two widely used ones are the Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) , both in the simple (DF) and the 'augmented' (ADF) version, and the KPSS test, proposed by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) . A precise description of these tests is given in the Appendix. Here we mention only two features of the tests that are necessary to understand the empirical application. First, both tests depend on a parameter which must be chosen in advance: we shall write ADF(k) and KPSS(w). Second, the null hypothesis for the ADF(k) test is non-stationarity, so that rejection suggests stationarity; by contrast, the null for the KPSS(w) test is stationarity, so that rejection signals non-stationarity. The KPSS test is preferable because of the null of stationarity, but it can be affected by small-sample distortions (see the Appendix). Hence, adding the ADF test can be useful.
Our proposed procedure is then the following. First, we take the two series of prices and compute the log of the ratio. Second, we apply both the ADF test, for different values of k, and the KPSS test, for different values of w. If we can reject stationarity (with the KPSS test) and cannot reject non-stationarity (with the ADF test) we conclude in favor of distinct markets.
By contrast, if we cannot reject stationarity we do not get a definite conclusion. This is a consequence of the arbitrage argument delineated above, which is inherently asymmetric: while non-stationarity implies different markets, stationarity could in principle be observed even if markets are distinct. This would happen for instance when prices themselves are stationary, or are affected only by common sources of non-stationary variation during the sample period. However, if (log) prices are non-stationary in levels and we know that they have been affected by several sources of variation, a consistent conclusion of stationarity (i.e. difference-stationarity is rejected and stationarity is not) can be interpreted as an indication in favor of market singleness.
It is worth noting that, in the above formulation of the stationarity tests, we are allowing for the existence of a non-zero mean for the log of the price ratio. This means that we are not necessarily ruling out the possibility of persistent and large differences in price levels. This is because the mere existence of such differences does not necessarily imply separate markets, unless products are perfectly homogeneous. For instance, the half-liter brick of fresh milk probably belongs in the same market as the one-liter brick, but the price of two half liters is higher than the price of one liter (probably because many singles and small families simply cannot consume one liter in a few days).
Perfect product homogeneity is the exception rather than the rule. In most cases similar products have small but non-negligible differences as for the quality, the package, the location in which they are available, or simply consumers' perception driven by advertising. Such differences often generate differences in price levels. The question is not whether such differences exist, but whether they are stable over time. If, for a given price ratio (different from 1) the elasticity of substitution is very large, a change in one price induced by whatever shock will be followed, sooner or later, by a proportional change in the other, so that we will observe stationarity of the price ratio.
To conclude this section, let us observe that the concept of 'long run' plays an important role in the arbitrage argument above. But how long is the long run in the present context? The question is relevant for empirical purposes. Clearly the long run should be long enough to allow for full deployment of competition forces, which reasonably takes much less than what we consider long run in Macroeconomics. In the empirical application below we take a sample period of two years, with weekly observations. With no data limitations, a sample period of three or four years would perhaps be preferable.
Relations with the literature
Let us begin this section by observing that the DF test (of order zero) perfectly coincides with one of the tests originally proposed by Horowitz (1981) , i.e. the test described at p.9, with the null γ = 0 in equation (3), the only difference being that the test is applied to the difference of prices, rather than the difference of the logs. The author however does not seem to be aware of this, since he does not present the test as a stationarity test and does not mention the difficulties related to the non-standard distribution of the t-statistic. The arbitrage argument invoked in the previous section is essentially the same behind the 'price comovement' literature, starting from the just mentioned work by Horowitz (1981) and the paper by Stigler and Sherwin (1985) .
However, the formulation and the implementation proposed here have some noticeable advantages with respect to the price comovement tests proposed so far, while retaining both simplicity and minimal data requirements.
A first problem with correlation is that it ignores lagged relations. For instance, assume that (a) data are weekly, (b) the log price of the first good is a random walk, so that the first difference∆p 1t is serially uncorrelated, and (c) the log price of the second good adjusts with a lag of k weeks, i.e. ∆p 2t = ∆p 1t−k , k > 0. In this case prices are strictly related, but the contemporaneous correlation of ∆p 1t and ∆p 2t is zero. The problem is that we should not limit ourselves to analyzing contemporaneous correlations, but consider also what happens at different leads and lags.
1 The stationarity analysis proposed here, being a long-run analysis, does not suffer from this problem. In the example above, the log price ratio would be p 1t − p 2t = ∆ k p 1t , which is stationary for any k.
Second, the long-run nature of our approach also render it largely immune from another major criticism to the use of correlation and other price comovement tests; namely, that they are related with an economic notion of market, rather than the Antitrust notion, defined in the merger guidelines (Werden and Froeb, 1993) . In fact, non-stationarity provides indirect evidence of potential market power. When the price ratio is non-stationary, there are permanent (and possibly large) changes in one price which are not followed by any reaction of the other price. This means that a hypothetic monopolist producing one of the products involved could have permanently raised its price by a significant amount, without suffering from the competition of the firms producing the other. In other terms, observing prices that move indefinitely far from each other seems inconsistent with both the economic and the antitrust market notions.
Last, both correlation and Granger causation analysis require that prices are co-stationary either in levels or in first differences. For instance, if correlation changes with time, sample correlation is not an estimate of any meaningful population moment. Similarly, as clarified below, cointegration requires costationarity of first differences. By contrast, the test proposed here does not require that the first differences of the two prices be co-stationary. This is particularly important when, as often happens in practice, prices are not I(1), so that neither correlation nor Granger causation nor cointegration analysis can be applied.
The stationarity tests proposed here are closely related with cointegration analysis, which has been proposed for market definition by Ardeni (1989) and has been applied in several works since then. Precisely, the relation is that, if prices are co-stationary in first differences of the logs, stationarity of the log of the ratio is equivalent to cointegration of the log prices, with cointegrating vector ( 1 −1 ).
Usually, cointegration studies do not test for the latter restriction, i.e. that the cointegrating vector must be ( 1 −1 ). Walls (1994) is to my knowledge the first work in which the importance of testing for the cointegrating vector ( 1 −1 ) is clearly stated. Walls's procedure is in three steps: First, the ADF test is applied to each price separately, in order to establish that it is I(1); second, cointegration is tested and, third, the cointegrating vector restriction is tested.
While being conceptually equivalent, the procedure proposed here has some advantages with respect to this cointegration test strategy. First, it is much simpler. Second, the two conditions in steps two and three are tested jointly, which is conceptually preferable and more efficient. Third, as observed above, it is more general, in that it does not require that the log prices be both I(1). Finally, being based on the price ratio, it is insensitive to the use of nominal rather than deflated data, whereas cointegration tests can lead to different results.
Finally, I must mention that the use of stationarity tests is proposed by Lexecon Ltd.,in a memo dated July 2001 (Lexecon 2001). While the ideas in this note and the present work are similar, the two works have been produced independently.
An empirical application to the Italian milk market
In several merger cases during the nineties, the Italian antitrust Authority argued that the market for fresh milk has regional geographic dimension. This dimension was identified by means of qualitative considerations, and particularly that the product is highly perishable-a feature partly due to Italian law, which imposes a tight expiry date (four days We analyze prices obtained by elaborating on the data base Nielsen Scant- Figure 6 .1 provides a general idea of the behavior of average milk prices during this period. In part (a) we have the average price for Italy; in part (b) we have two southern regions, Sicily and Campania; in part (c) two central regions, Tuscany and Lazio; in part (d) two northern regions, Emilia and Piedmont. Prices are generally increasing; but they do not seem to increase in the same way everywhere. In Sicily, for instance, there has been a very large increment, so that milk is now much more expensive than in Campania, whereas it was less expensive in March 1999. In Tuscany and Lazio prices were similar in 1999; in February 2000 there was a big jump in Tuscany and Lazio followed only partially and with a very large delay. Finally, the difference between average prices in Emilia and Piedmont was about 60 lire during 1999 and the first months of 2000, then reduced to 10-20 lire in May and increased again in July 2000 to stabilize around 120 lire. Below we show that the percentage deviations between the above couples of prices are non-stationary.
The tests
Let us come to the tests. For each couple of regions, we computed the difference of the logs of prices. Then we computed the KPSS test with two Bartlett window sizes, 8 months and 16 months, and the ADF test of orders 4 and 8. Results are reported in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.
As shown in Table 6 .1, stationarity is very often rejected at least at the 10% significance level. Some results are notable. First, Sicily, which, being an island, has no neighboring regions, is the only region for which stationarity is strongly rejected in relation with all other regions for both window sizes. Second, for several couples of regions we cannot reject stationarity. Obviously, in some cases this happens by mere chance, simply because of the stochastic nature of the experiment and the fact that the number of couples involved is high. But in some cases the low value of the test is probably due to a relative openness of the market. For instance, regarding Emilia, we can reject stationarity for all regions except the neighboring Tuscany, Veneto, and Lombardy. As for Veneto, we cannot reject stationarity with respect to Emilia. Finally, stationarity cannot be rejected for the neighboring Piedmont and Lombardy. Overall, these results seem quite reasonable. Table 6 .2 reports the ADF test statistics. The table provides essentially a confirmation of the above results. The null of non-stationarity is rejected only in a small number of cases even at the 10% level. Many rejections are specular to the rejections lacking in the previous table.
Where non-stationarity is rejected at least at the 10% level, we report the mean lag of the response to the shock implied by the estimated coefficients of the ADF equations (the number in brackets). The impulse-response functions were taken in absolute values. The mean lag gives an idea of the time taken by the price deviation to go back to its average level. This can be useful because, in presence of a stationarity result, it seems reasonable to require that it not take too much time to go back to equilibrium.
For some couples the mean lag is very large. Lazio-Veneto (about twenty weeks) and Trentino-Veneto (16-17 weeks) are the most striking examples. Very large values of the mean lag should induce some caution in interpreting the stationarity result as evidence in favor of a single market. Our suspicion is confirmed by the fact that for both the couples above stationarity is rejected by the KPSS test. Table 6 .3 summarizes results. We say that stationarity (non-stationarity) is strongly rejected when it is rejected at the 5% level with both the KPSS window sizes (both orders of the ADF test). Stationarity (non-stationarity) is weakly rejected when it is rejected at the 10% level with at least one of the KPSS window sizes (ADF orders), but strong rejection does not hold. In all other cases we say that stationarity (non-stationarity) is not rejected. As shown in the Table, stationarity is strongly rejected for almost half of the couples and weakly rejected for another third. It is worth noting that in a few cases (4) we do not get a definite conclusion in favor of non-stationarity because non-stationarity is also rejected (even if in the weak form). Such rejection of both stationarity and non-stationarity has already been obtained in the literature (see e.g. Kwiatkowski et al. 1992) . It shows that the ADF test can add useful information with respect to the KPSS test, not only by reinforcing, but also by contradicting the conclusion of non-stationarity.
Summary results
For only 15 cases out of 78 (less than 20%) stationarity is not rejected. In most of these cases, also non-stationarity cannot be rejected, so that we cannot conclude in favor of stationarity. A consistent conclusion of stationarity is obtained only in 6 cases, for which stationarity is not rejected and non-stationarity is rejected, at least weakly. The percentage of such cases is not far from the figure that we would have obtained because of the stochastic nature of the series, the null of non-stationarity being true for all the log price ratios. White: Stationarity is strongly rejected, non-stationarity is not rejected; Light gray: Stationarity is weakly rejected, nonstationarity is not rejected; Dark gray: Stationarity is not rejected, non-stationarity is weakly rejected; Black: Stationarity is not rejected, non-stationarity is strongly rejected; Medium gray: All other cases. Figure 6 .2 reports the summary results for each couple of regions. Clearly Sicily forms a separate market, since stationarity is strongly rejected with respect to all regions. For the other regions we conclude in favor of a separate market if we can reject stationarity without ambiguity for all the neighboring regions, at least in the weak sense (white and light-gray cells).
With this criterion Calabria, Campania, Puglia, Lazio, Liguria and Marche represent distinct markets. For the other regions the picture is less clear. However, Lombardy cannot be in the same market with Veneto or Trentino; Tuscany is separate with respect to Lazio, Marche and Liguria, Piedmont cannot be in the same market with Liguria; Emilia-Romagna cannot be in the same market with Liguria and Marche. On the other hand, Piedmont could be linked to Lombardy and Veneto could be linked to Emilia. Overall, results seem consistent with the hypothesis of separate regional markets.
Against a smaller geographic dimension
What about the possibility of a smaller geographic dimension?
Unfortunately, we do not have data for provinces, so that we cannot perform a more disaggregated analysis. Nonetheless, we have data for the province of Milan and the rest of Lombardy. Moreover, we can get useful indications by looking at prices of different brands operating in the same region. For Lombardy we have prices for twelve important brands, which are present for the whole sample period: Lactis, Latte Magenta, Latte Milano, Pavilat, Polenghi, Prealpina, Granarolo, Granarolo S.Giorgio, Centrale di Brescia, Centrale di Milano, Centrale di Monza, Marche Private. If the market is truly regional, we should not observe frequent rejection of stationarity between different brands. On the other hand, since many brands are sold mainly in a single province or a couple of provinces, a frequent rejection of stationarity could be read as an indication in favor of a smaller geographical dimension. Let us consider first the log-price ratio of Milan and the rest of Lombardy. Stationarity is not rejected (KPSS(8)=0.118, KPSS(12)=0.093) and non-stationarity is weakly rejected (ADF(4)=-3.32, ADF(8)=-2.32). The mean lag is 2.8 weeks with the ADF(4) and 4.6 with the ADF (8) . These results suggest that Milan and the rest of Lombardy lie in the same market. Figure 6 .3 compares the case of Milan and the rest of Lombardy (right-hand side) and the case of Sicily and Trentino (left-hand side). These cases can be taken as paradigms for the two opposite outcomes of the stationarity tests and can then help the reader to get a more concrete idea of the method. In the latter case it is seen that the two prices move far apart during the sample period. The percentage deviation shown in the lower part of the figure follows a positive trend. With reference to the simulated series of Figure 4 .1, its behavior resembles the non-stationary series of part (b). By contrast, Milan and the rest of Lombardy follow similar paths. The graph of the percentage deviation exhibits important differences for some periods, but such differences are temporary. With reference to Figure 4 .1, the graph is much more similar to the stationary series of part (a).
Next we test for each one of the above twelve Lombard brands with respect to the reference brands Latte Milano, Centrale di Milano and Centrale di Monza, which are diffused in the geographical core of the region. Results are shown in Table 6 .4. With respect to Centrale di Monza, we have a weak rejection of stationarity for Granarolo. With respect to Latte Milano, we get a weak rejection for Lactis, Granarolo and Marche Private; however, also non-stationarity can be weakly rejected for all these brands, so that rejection is not consistent. With respect to Centrale di Milano, we get a weak, but consistent rejection for Lactis, Granarolo and Marche Private. These rejections are too few, weak and inconsistent with respect to different reference points and tests to contradict the hypothesis that Lombardy makes up a single market.
Obviously, in most cases administrative boundaries can at best be an approximation for the economic boundaries which are relevant for antitrust purposes. Probably the Emilian province of Piacenza, which is close to Milan and connected to Milan by a fast motorway, is in the same market with Milan, while the Lombard mountains of Sondrio are not. With our data we cannot verify this conjecture. Moreover, in principle the relevant area should be centered on the place where the firms involved are located. Hence if the firms are located in Milan, Lombardy can be the geographic market, but if the firms are located e.g. in Mantova, the relevant area should include part of Lombardy, Veneto and Emilia. With these caveats, we interpret our results as suggesting that the regional market size is a reasonable description of reality. 
